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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The resolution of this breach of contract action turns upon the constitutionality of the Idaho 
Legislature's attempted retroactive repeal of!. C. § 72-915 for the express purpose of depriving one 
of the parties to that contract of its vested rights so that the other party to that contract could be 
relieved of its contractual obligations. Two Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class 
(collectively referred to as "CDA Dairy Queen"), brought this action. They are seeking to recover 
"rate readjustments" (sometimes referred to as dividends) which they were contractually entitled to 
receive upon the premiums they paid for workers' compensation insurance policies issued by the 
Defendant, Idaho State Insurance Fund, (hereinafter "SIF"). 
It is alleged that each of the named Plaintiffs and all of the members of the proposed class 
are Idaho employers who purchased contracts of workers' compensation insurance with the SIF. 
First Amended Complaint ~ 8, R.27. The "Class" includes all subscribers to workers' compensation 
insurance policies issued by the SIF (hereinafter "policyholders") who: 
1. Acquired their policy during the class period; 
2. Were billed an annual premium of more than $2,500; 
3. Held their policies for at least six months prior to the effective date ofSB 
1166aa; and, 
4. Did not for one or more ofthe relevant periods (one year blocks of time which the 
SIF calls "dividend periods") during the "class period," receive at least a pro rata 
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share ofthe amount being distributed by the SIF as a rate readjustment. 
First Amended Complaint ~ 15, R.30-31. The "class period" is defined as "Dividend Periods 
beginning on July 1,2002 and including all Dividend Periods ending on or before June 30, 2009." 
First Amended Complaint ~ 12, R.29. 
This action is not a re-litigation of the claims asserted in Farber, et al. v. Idaho State 
Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289(2009) (hereinafter Farber). There are many 
similarities, but there are also two important distinctions which result in this action involving a new 
class and a new and pivotal issue. 
First, Farber was initiated, pursued and ultimately resolved solely on behalf of a class 
composed of policyholders who were billed, for one or more policy years during the class period, 
$2,500 or less in premiums. This delineation was based on the fact that at the time the action was 
initiated, the SIF was wrongly treating those policyholders as being ineligible to receive any share 
of the rate readjustment. The impropriety of the formula being used as to other policyholders was 
not then known to Plaintiffs and their Counsel. I Only policyholders who were billed $2,500 or less 
for any given policy year during the class period were included in the Farber class for that policy 
year. In contrast, the policyholders who would be included in the CDA Dairy Queen class are those 
policyholders who were billed, for one or more policy years during the class period, over $2,500 in 
1 In most years at issue in Farber, all of the class members received no rate readjustment. There 
were however, a few years in which policyholders who paid $1,500 or more but less than $2,501 received 
an amount which was less than a pro rata share of the rate readjustment. There were also two years in 
which most policyholders who paid less than $2,501 were eligible to receive a payment which in all cases 
was less than a pro rata share of the rate readjustment. 
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premiums and they are class members only for those policy years in which they were billed over 
$2,500 in premiums. Thus, Farber and this action each pertain to two distinctly different classes. 
Second, before CDA Dairy Queen filed this action, the Idaho Legislature in direct and 
immediate response to the Farber decision, repealed I.C. § 72-915 and purported to make that repeal 
retroactive to January 1,2003. CDA Dairy Queen does not question the Legislature's power to 
repeal I.C. § 72-915 prospectively (as to any contract entered into less than six months before the 
effective date of the repeal).2 However, the attempt to materially change contracts retroactively, so 
as to relieve the SIP of its fixed and determinable obligations under those contracts, gives rise to a 
pivotal constitutional challenge which was not before the Farber Court. CDA Dairy Queen contends 
that, with respect to contracts which included rights which vested prior to any legislative action, Art. 
I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution exists to protect it from legislative action which relieves the SIP of 
its obligations by depriving CDA Dairy Queen ofthe opportunity to benefit from those vested rights. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. A Class Action Complaint was filed on December 24, 2009. 
2 An Amended Class Action Complaint was filed on June 10,2010, R. 6-40, and it was served 
June, 18,2010. 
2 The enactment declared the existence of an emergency. To the extent that this is a supportable 
declaration, then the repeal would be effective on May 6, 2009, when it was signed by the Governor. 
However, given that the next rate readjustment would not have been considered until December of 2009, 
there appears to be no basis in fact or law to support the declaration of an emergency. If that declaration 
is invalid, then the repeal would not be effective until July 1,2009. This question was not directly raised 
for determination by District Court and it was mooted by the District Court's determination that 
retroactive application back to January 1,2003, was constitutionally permissible. 
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3. SIP answered on July 1,2010, R. 41-53, and subsequently amended that Answer on July 21, 
2010. R. 54- 67. 
4. Pursuant to I.C. § 10-1211, the Attorney General was served and declined to appear. 
5. CDA Dairy Queen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (including supporting 
affidavits and memoranda) on September 23,2010, in which they requested that the District 
Court determine that the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915, if applied retroactively, would violate the 
protections afforded by Art. I, Section 16, of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho.3 R. 68-
70. 
6. SIP filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (including supporting affidavits and 
memorandum) on October 26,2010, in which it requested that the District Court determine 
that the emergency repeal ofLC. § 72-915, should be applied retroactively to January 1, 
2003, and that this application did not violate protections afforded by either the U.S. or the 
Idaho Constitutions. R. 207-208. 
7. CDA Dairy Queen filed a Motion to Strike all of the Affidavit of James Alcorn and portions 
of the Affidavit of Counsel which were filed by the SIP in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. See, Plaintiffs' Motion to Augment The Record, Item 7. 
8. The matter was heard by the Court on December 15,2010. 
9. The District Court did not rule upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavits because it 
indicated it would not be relying upon any portion of the challenged information. Tr. 5:5 to 
3 The record also reflects that CDA Dairy Queen filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment 
relative to the Defendants' 14th Affirmative Defense but the documents in the record relative to that 
Motion (R. 204 - 206) are irrelevant to this appeal. 
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6:15. 
10. The District Court, ruling from the bench, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in a written order filed 
on 12128110. Tr. 105:1 to 119:11. 
11. Judgment against Plaintiffs was entered on 1/4/2011. R. 360-362. 
12. Appellants' Notice of Appeal timely filed on 1127/2011. R. 363-366. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The SIF was established by the Idaho Legislature in 1917. See, Idaho Code, Title 72, 
Chapter 9. For the first 92 years of the SIF's existence, its sole authority to distribute its surplus as 
rate readjustments to its policyholders derived from I.C. § 72-915, which read as follows: 
72-915. Dividends.·- At the end of every year, and as such other times as the manager 
in his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the 
several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance 
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which the manager deems 
may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual 
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state insurance fund for a 
period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such readjustment, such proportion of 
such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the 
last readjustment of rates (emphasis added). 
This Court has confirmed that this statute is incorporated into and becomes a term of the 
contracts between the SIF and its policyholders and that it affords the SIF's Manager the discretion 
to determine \vhether to declare a rate readjustment and to determine the total amount of the surplus 
to be distributed among the SIF's policyholders. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund; and 
Drew Forney, Manager a/the State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138; 997 P. 2d 591, 599 
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(2000). This Court has also held that this statute clearly and unambiguously requires that the 
Manager must distribute the rate readjustment on a pro rata basis among all policyholders who held 
their policy for at least six months during the period affected by the rate readjustment, giving 
consideration only to billed premiums for the applicable period. Farber, 147 Idaho at 31 0, 208 P.3d 
at 292. The decision in Farber did not operate to change the law, to interpret an ambiguity in the 
law, or to change the effect previously given to it by any Idaho Appellate Court. 
While in the years since 1917 there have been substantial revisions to many of the statutes 
pertaining to the SIP, the language ofI.C. § 72-915 has been amended only to change the language 
relative to the person charged with discretion over and responsibility for the distribution of any rate 
readjustments. Compare, 1917 S.L., Ch. 81, §92, p. 252, with 1939 S.L., Ch. 251, §15, p. 617 and 
1941 S.L., Ch. 20, §13, p. 37(see Appendix A). In 1951, the Legislature took away the SIF's ability 
to make assessments against policyholders but did not in any way change the language ofLC. § 72-
915. See, 1951 S.L. Ch. 269, §1, p. 570. 
Perhaps the most significant revisions of the law pertaining to the SIF occurred when in1998, 
the Idaho Legislature passed House Bill 774. R. 87-100. The Bill, HB 774, was a by-product ofa 
special legislative task force that spent a year between the 1997 and 1998 sessions drafting the Bil1. 
R.102. That legislation, among other things not remotely relevant to this action, restructured the 
management of the SIF (creating a Board of Directors with power to oversee the Manager); clarified 
and delineated the respective powers and responsibilities of the Manager and the Board; repealed I.e. 
§ 72-911, which had previously included language bearing upon the accumulation ofreserves and 
surplus, and provided for the SIF to be deemed, for the purposes of regulation by the Idaho 
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Department of Insurance, a mutual insurance company. It is apparent that the Legislature did 
discuss dividends and that the SIP's continued ability to distribute dividends was considered by the 
Legislature, e.g. R.1 04, but there was never any indication that the provisions of I.C. § 72-915 were 
considered to be inadequate or in need of change. R. 100-161 (Legislative History). 
In the decade following the passage ofHB 774 in 1998, the SIF utilized an allocation formula 
which had been used for several prior years and which impermissibly failed to make a pro rata 
distribution of the rate readjustment funds deemed to be available for allocation. R.172 -174 & 180-
183. The formula correctly utilized "billed premiums" as a starting point but thereafter completely 
departed from the clear and unambiguous requirements of the contract. Billed premiums were 
incorrectly reduced for underwriting expenses based upon a percentage of the billed premium which 
percentage was decreased as the amount of billed premium increased. The remaining amount was 
then, if applicable, further incorrectly reduced by a "loss factor" (1.18 times any losses on the 
policy). The remaining amount, if any, was multiplied by a "rate of return" ("return percentage") 
which incorrectly increased as the amount of billed premium increased. R. 173 & 175. Initially, this 
contractually impermissible formula was used to calculate rate readjustments for all policyholders 
regardless of the amount of premium paid. In 2002, the Board decided to pay no rate readjustment 
at all to policyholders whose billed premium did not exceed a minimum (initially $2,500 and later 
changed to $1,500). 
The decision to pay no rate readjustment to policyholders whose premium was $2,500 or less 
was addressed by this Court in an initial opinion issued March 5, 2009 and, following a petition for 
rehearing, in a replacement opinion issued May 5, 2009. Farber, 147 Idaho 309, 208 P. 3d 293-291. 
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In both decisions, the Supreme Court determined that Idaho Code § 72-915, was a material term of 
the contract which clearly and unambiguously required that, for any policy period in respect to which 
the SIF elected to pay a rate readjustment, the funds available for that readjustment had to be divided 
among all time-qualified policyholders (those who held their policy for at least six months) pro rata 
based solely upon the amount of the premium which each had been billed. Farber, 147 Idaho 311-
312,208 P. 3d 293-294. 
In the two-month interval between these two Supreme Court decisions, State Senator John 
Goedde, a member of the SIF's Board of Directors, presented SB 1166to the Senate Commerce and 
Human Resources Committee. The minutes reflect that he testified the Bill would "serve to offset 
an adverse decision of the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation ofIdaho Code, Section 
72-915 ... " but that he was not intending to "circumvent the Supreme Court's decision."R.186-188. 
Senate Bill 1166, in its original form, acknowledged the Farber decision. It included a 
statement purporting to reflect the legislative intention underlying the 1998 amendments to the laws 
regulating the SIF which is facially inconsistent with the recorded legislative history ofHB 774. R. 
85-161. Relying upon this self-serving revisionist hindsight, the Bill expressed the theory that a 
conflict existed in the laws regulating the SIF, and, upon that basis, it provided for a repeal ofIdaho 
Code 72-915 retroactive to April, 1998. R. 184. When SB 1166 was presented to the Senate 
Commerce and Human Resources Committee on April 7, 2010, testimony from representatives of 
the Farber class challenged the Bill on the basis that if applied retroactively it would impair the 
obligations and rights of contracts. A majority of the committee members voted to hold the Bill in 
Committee. R. 186-193. On April 14, 2010, the Bill came back before the Committee with 
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representations that agreements had been reached to amend the Bill. On that basis SB 1166 was sent 
to the Senate Amending Order, R. 194, were it became SB 1166aa. As amended, the Bill provided 
for retroactive effect "only" to January 1,2003, and specifically stated that it was not in any way 
intended to apply to any claims made in Farber v. State Insurance Fund. SB 1166aa, R. 185, passed 
through both the Senate and the House and was signed by the Governor on May 6th, 2009. (SB 1166aa 
is attached as Appendix B). 
On this record, the District Court determined that SB 1166aa was constitutional and in doing 
so made several determinations each of which CDA Dairy Queen contends are contrary to the law 
and unsupported by the facts in the record before the District Court. The District Court began by 
concluding that it could properly look past established Idaho precedent and rely upon the analytical 
calculus utilized by federal courts in deciding if state action violates the Federal "Contracts Clause" 
(Art. 1 § 10 ofthe United States Constitution). Tr. 115:12-16 and Tr. 118:21-25. 
Utilizing this "federal approach" the District Court addressed three questions. First, the 
District Court considered whether any contracts existed that provided for pro rata rate readjustments 
(Tr. 116:5-8) and concluded that even if such contracts existed a retroactive application ofthe repeal 
would not substantially impair those contracts because there would only be a "minimal effect on 
some policyholders" and because the contracts were "primarily set up to provide coverage ... not for 
the payment of dividends." Tr.117:21-23. Second, the District Court considered whether there was 
a significant and legitimate public purpose underlying a retroactive application of the repeal ofLC. 
§ 72-915 and concluded that the Legislature's primary concern was the protection of the State's 
economy and that this was a "grave concern." Tr.117:14-28 and 118:12-16. Third, the District Court 
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considered whether the means used to protect the economy of the State - i.e. the retroactive repeal 
ofLC. §72-915 - was a reasonable means and ofa character appropriate to that end and concluded 
that it was. Tr. 117:23-118:2 and 118:12-16. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
A. Is a retroactive change imposed by the Idaho Legislature upon a material term of 
contracts between, on the one hand, citizens of and businesses in Idaho and, on the 
other, an entity created by and overseen by the same Legislature a violation of Art. 
I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits state action which impairs the 
obligations of contracts? 
B. Does federal decisional law relative to restrictions imposed on impairment of 
contracts by state action, as set out in Art. 1 § 10 of the U.S. Constitution provide 
a relevant basis upon which a retroactive change imposed by the Idaho Legislature 
upon a material term of the contracts at issue in this matter can be rationally found 
to be permissible notwithstanding the prohibition against state action which impairs 
the obligations of contracts set out in Art. I §16 of the Idaho Constitution? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. SCOPE OF REVIEW 
As this appeal involves a constitutional challenge to legislative action, the Supreme Court 
exercises free review. Credit Bureau ofE. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 468, 469,253 P .3d 
1188, 1190 (2010). To the extent that this action requires interpretation of a legislative enactment, 
this action presents a question oflaw over which this Supreme Court exercises de novo review. V-J 
Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519, 521 (2000). 
B. SUMkURYOFARGUMENT 
CDA Dairy Queen contends that to the extent that SB 1166aa operates to retroactively 
remove a material term from contracts which were in existence more than six months prior to the 
effective date of the Bill, the Bill is an unconstitutional legislative action. CDA Dairy Queen 
acknowledges that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, that reasonable doubts 
should be resolved in favor of constitutionality and that the burden of demonstrating that the law 
should be declared unconstitutional rests upon that party making that claim. Oneida County Fair 
Boardv. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 P.2d 374, 376 (1963). However, this Court has the power 
to declare enactments unconstitutional in clear cases. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35,40,232 P.3d 
813,818 (2010). This is a clear case. 
When SB 1166aa is considered in view ofthe prohibition of Art. I § 16, Idaho Constitution 
and the consistent application of that prohibition in decisions of this Court, it is apparent that the 
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attempt to retroactively repeal I.C. § 72-915 is clearly void because it is unconstitutional. Federal 
decisional law, which was relied upon by the District Court, is not relevant because it relies upon an 
interpretation of Art. 1 § 1 0 of the United States Constitution which provides less protection to Idaho 
citizens than is provided by Art. I §16, Idaho Constitution.4 
C. THE RETROACTIVE CHANGE IMPOSED BY THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE UPON 
A MATERIAL TERM OF CONTRACTS AT ISSUE CONSTITUTES A CLEAR 
VIOLATION OF ART I §16 OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION 
1. A contract exists between the parties which includes the requirement that 
any rate readjustments be distributed upon a pro rata basis among time-
qualified policyholders considering only the amount of premium paid 
The District Court professed uncertainty about whether the contracts between CDA Dairy 
Queen and the SIP included a contractual right to share in any rate readjustments on a pro rata basis. 
Tr.116:5-8. The facts and the law do not support any such uncertainty. 
4 CDA Dairy Queen sees the District Court's foray into federal decisional law as completely 
unnecessary because Art. I § 16 as applied by Idaho decisional law clearly prohibits the retroactive 
application of SB 1166aa. Until the SIF is able to identifY Idaho case law which provides justification 
for this Court to ignore Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 56 at 67,28P.2d 824 at 828 (Idaho, 1933) and 
Fidelity State Bank v. North Fork Highway District, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449(1922) and their progeny or 
articulates any basis upon which those decisions can be overruled, CDA Dairy Queen sees no point in 
detailing and discussing the other numerous defects in the District Court's decision. CDA Dairy Queen 
does not intend to waive or to be seen as waiving the right to present these arguments which include in 
overview: a) the District Court completely misplaced reliance upon National Railway v. Atchison 
Topeka, 470 U.S. 451 (1985); b) the District Court erred in relying upon cases such as RUI One v. 
Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) without recognizing their lack of relevance to the retroactive 
changes made by SB 1166aa; c) the District Court made a series of erroneous and unsupported factual 
determinations; and, d) the District Court relied upon its own erroneous factual determinations and 
unsupported and illogical claims made by the Idaho Legislature to incorrectly conclude that retroactive 
application of SB 1166aa was constitutional when evaluated using the analytical approach described in 
RUIOne. 
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The policies of workers , compensation insurance issued by the SIF to the CDA Dairy Queen 
and thousands of other Idaho employers are acknowledged by the SIF to be contracts for the 
provision of insurance coverage. See, Paragraph A of the policy, R. 74. At all times during the 
class period, the terms and conditions of the contracts between the SIF and its policyholders included 
not only the provisions of its written policy but also the Idaho statutes creating and governing the SIF 
which were in force at the time the contract was entered into. Hayden Lake Fire Protection District 
v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399, 111 P.3d 73, 84 (2005), Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance 
Fund; and Drew Forney, Manager o/the State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho l30, l38; 997 P. 2d 591, 
599 ( 2000), Straus and Nicholson v. Ketchum, 54 Idaho 56 at 67; 28 P.2d 824 at 828 (1933). 
Given that Idaho Code § 72-915 was in existence until the (arguably) effective date ofSB 
1166aa there is no rational basis upon which the District Court could question the existence of 
contracts which included a material term that provided a right to be paid a pro rata share of any 
amount which the SIF's Manager determined could be allocated as a rate readjustment. This right 
vested as soon as the policyholder held a contract of insurance with the SIF for more than six 
months. Moreover, any such uncertainty is fully resolved by this Court's decision in Farber. 
See, 147 Idaho at 311, 208 P.3d at 293. In even suggesting that the existence of a right to a pro rata 
share of any amount which the Manager of the SIF determined could be allocated as a rate 
readjustment was open to question, the District Court was clearly mistaken. 
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2. SB 1166aa vitiates a material term of tens of thousands of contracts and the 
change substantially impairs a material vested right under those contracts. 
The District Court erroneously concluded both that the right to receive a pro rata share of 
any funds distributed as a rate readjustment was not a material term of the contracts for workers' 
compensation coverage, Tr. 117:6-9 and that the harm that would be done by retroactively removing 
that right from those contracts did not substantially impair the contracts because the damage done 
was "minimal." Tr. 117: 10-13 & 21-24. The District Court gave no consideration to the fact that, 
as to all contracts formed more than six months before the effective date of the statute, the right to 
receive a pro rata share of any funds which the Manager decided to distribute as rate readjustments 
was a fully vested right. 
The relevant facts and binding Idaho precedent preclude the District Court from determining 
that the right to receive a pro rata share of any funds distributed as a rate readjustment is not a 
material term of the contract. A rate readjustment as described in I.C. §72-915 is the equivalent of 
a refund of a portion of the premium paid to acquire the policy. The consideration paid for a 
contractual benefit has long been acknowledged to be one of the material and necessary elements 
of a contract. See., e.g. Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417, 418, 529 P.2d 1289, 1290 (1974). The fact 
that workers' compensation insurance policies provide coverage does not diminish in any way the 
materiality of the price term of the contract.5 The District Court cites no authority which suggests 
that the price term of a contract or terms which affect the price of a contract can ever be considered 
5 One wonders how the SIP would respond to the argument that the policy was not really about 
the payment of premiums if it were being made by a person who the SIP had sued to recover the balance 
of the premium billed for coverage. 
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to be immaterial terms of the contract. 
The relevant facts and law also preclude a determination that the damage caused by vitiating 
the right to receive a pro rata share of any funds distributed as a rate readjustment is either minimal 
or insubstantial. First it should be noted that, as the District Court appears to acknowledge, Idaho 
decisions do not turn upon substantiality. Citing from Fidelity State Bank v. North Fork Highway 
District, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449 (1922) the District Court indicated that: 
Any enactment of a legislative character is said to 'impair' the obligation of a contract which 
attempts to take from a party a right to which he is entitled by its terms or which deprives 
him of the means of enforcing such right. 
Tr. 116:14-18. 
Even assuming that substantiality is a proper consideration, the record adequately 
demonstrates that the amount at issue is substantial. Senator Goedde, a member of SIP's Board of 
Directors, testified in the Senate hearings that the aggregate amount at issue was in the range of$24 
million dollars. R. 188. The record in this case does not permit a demonstration of how the SIF 
determined this number but it is plainly a substantial amount. 
The record in this case does permit calculations which independently demonstrate 
substantiality. Utilizing the information which is fully available in the record, for those policies 
issued in a three year period beginning on or after July 1,2004 and before June 31,2007, the average 
percentage of the premium refundable in a pro rata allocation of the amount distributed as a rate 
readjustment is 7.6%. R. 259. In spite ofthis evidence, the District Court gave no consideration to 
the determination of the Court of Appeals that a contract price adjustment of 5% could not be 
considered to be insubstantial. City of Hayden, v. Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467, 
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468, 700 P.2d 89, 90 (Ct App. 1985). 
Even if the average rate of readjustment were not on its face sufficient to establish 
substantiality, it is apparent that individual damages are also substantial. Applying the average rate 
readjustment rate of7.6% to the known premiums billed to Discovery Care Centre LLC of Salmon 
(the second named Plaintiff, hereinafter "Discovery Care") for policies for the three years on which 
the percentage is based (1/1/2005, 1/1/2006 and 1/1/2007 --$238,818.00, R.356)it becomes apparent 
that if retroactive repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is permitted Discovery Care (which received no rate 
readjustment in any of these years) will be deprived of about $18,000 which it was entitled to receive 
under the contracts it had with the SIF. This amount is on its face substantial. 
3. Based upon long-standing Idaho Law, to the extent it is given retroactive 
application, SB 1166aa violates the protections afforded to Idaho citizens 
and business by Art. I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Numerous Idaho decisions have held that the State Legislature may not change material terms 
of contracts which were in existence prior to the effective date of an enactment seeking to 
accomplish such a change. There have been no exceptions to this absolutist approach with respect 
to contracts among citizens and between citizens and governmental or quasi -governmental entities. 
In 1922, this Court decided Fidelity State Bank v. North Fork Highway District, 35 Idaho 
797,209 P. 449 (1922). In that case, a change in a state statute which the Legislature had intended 
to be applied retroactively would have caused funds which were deposited into a bank by the North 
Fork Highway District to have been re-characterized from funds held in trust to funds held as general 
deposits. Ifapplied retroactively, this statute would have favored the general depositors of the bank 
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which, in the bank's liquidation, had a right inferior to any funds held in trust. In discussing the 
applicable law this Court stated: 
A law enacted subsequent to a contract which, if valid, will have the effect of annulling the 
contract constitutes the most palpable form oflegislative impairment, and such an enactment 
is clearly unconstitutional... Legislation that attempts to make material alterations in the 
character, terms, or legal effect of existing contracts is clearly void. Of this character are 
statutes which attempt to add a material condition or provision to a contract, and those which 
attempt to release material stipulations contained therein. (citations omitted, emphasis 
added). 
Id., 35 Idaho 810,209 P. 452. Ultimately this Court held: 
It is a well-known fundamental rule oflaw that a state by the act of its legislature cannot alter 
the nature or legal effect of an existing contract to the prejudice of either party, nor can the 
legislature make a law for a particular case between two contracting parties contrary to the 
existing law and require the courts to enforce it. This rule is founded on two distinct 
principles of constitutional law, one prohibiting the assumption of judicial power by the 
legislative department, and the other inhibiting the impairment by a state of the obligation 
of contracts. The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms, by 
imposing new conditions or dispensing with conditions, or which adds new duties or releases 
or lessens any part of the contract obligation or substantially defeats its ends. It is not only 
private contracts that are protected from impairment by state law. The protection also extends 
to contracts made by a state or a municipal corporation. (emphasis added) 
Id., 35 Idaho at 813, 209 P. at 453. This holding has remained unquestioned for the last 89 years. 
In 1954, this Court decided Penrose v. Commercial Traveler's Insurance Co., 75 Idaho 524, 
275 P .2d 969 (1954). In that case, a change in state law which occurred after a contract of insurance 
had been issued to Penrose by Commercial Traveler's Insurance provided for an award of attorney 
fees if an insured successfully sued his insurance company for failing to pay an amount justly due 
on a claim. The resolution of the case required the Court to address two questions. The first 
question - was there coverage? - was resolved by a majority of the Court in the lead opinion in favor 
of coverage. The second question - did retroactive imposition ofthe statute providing for an award 
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of attorney's fees onto a pre-existing contract amount to an impennissible "impainnent of the 
obligations of contracts?" - was resolved by a three justice majority which held that the statute, as 
applied to contracts in existence at the time it was passed, impennissibly impaired the contract.6 
In 1993, this Court decided Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,850 P.2d 749 (1993). In that case 
this Court considered whether a statute which limited the rights of a trust deed beneficiary to initiate 
judicial action to collect upon the underlying note could be applied to notes and deeds of trust which 
were executed prior to the effective date of the statute and at a time when the beneficiaries' rights 
were broader. In reaching its decision, the Court expressly rejected language from an earlier Court 
of Appeals case which suggested that the applicability of the limitations imposed by the statute 
would turn not on the date ofthe contract vis-a-vis the effective date of the statute but rather upon 
the date the action was filed. In reaching its conclusion, the Court quoted favorably from Steward 
v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 437, 32 P.2d 843 (1934) in which the Court held that the law existing when a 
mortgage is made enters into and becomes a part of the contract, and any change in the law which 
operates to deny or to obstruct any rights accruing under the contract as fonned (including statutes 
then in effect) is a violation of Idaho's constitutional provision prohibiting any laws which impair 
6The tension between "change of contract" and "change of remedy" which is evident in the 
conflicting opinions in Penrose has continued to be present through a line of cases related to whether 
statutes imposing attorney fee awards can be applied to contracts in existence at the time that the statute 
is passed. The rule derived from this line of cases remains consistent with Penrose to the extent that if 
the change brought about by the statute affects the rights of only one party to the contract it is seen as 
materially and impermissibly changing the contract by changing the balance of power inherent in the 
contract. Where the rights of both parties are affected equally by the attorney fee statute then the change 
is not considered to be material and, consistent with "change of remedy" analysis, the only question 
considered relevant to "retroactive" application is whether the action was filed before the statute became 
effective. See, e.g. Myers v Vermas, 114 Idaho 85, 87-88, 753 P.2d 296,298-99 (Ct. App 1998), Ericson 
v. Blue Cross Health Servs., 116 Idaho 693, 695-696, 778 P.2d 815,817-818 (1989), Bott v.Idaho State 
Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 480-481,835 P.2d 1282, 1291-1292 (1996). 
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the obligations of contract. Id., 54 Idaho at 441 & 444, 32 P.2d at 845 & 846. Consistent with 
Steward v. Nelson, the Court held that the change in the statute could not be applied to limit the 
rights in place at the time that contract was executed. Curtis, 123 Idaho at 610,850 P.2d at 761. 
Applying this long-standing and consistently utilized analysis, it is apparent that the 
retroactive application ofSB 1166aa, is contrary to the protection afforded to CDA Dairy Queen by 
Art. I § 16 ofthe Idaho Constitution. It impermissibly works to change the contract by relieving the 
SIF ofthe obligation to pay refunds of premiums paid to it by the policyholders. Because it changes 
the rights of the plaintiffs and the duties of the SIF, the change materially impairs the contracts 
between the SIF and its policyholders and is, in the words of this Court in Fidelity, "clearly void." 
D. FEDERAL DECISIONAL LAW IS COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT TO THE 
RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER. 
1. Idaho's decisional law has properly imposed a broadly preclusive reading 
of Art. 1 § 16 of the Idaho Constitution, which affords greater protection to 
contractsformed in Idaho than is afforded to the same contracts by Art. 1 § 
10 of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by federal decisional law. 
Initially both state and federal constitutional provisions were seen by this Court to absolutely 
prohibit any legislative action which impaired a contract by destroying the contract or abolishing any 
of the obligations of the contract. In 1934, the Idaho Supreme Court observed: 
Under the federal and state constitutional provisions above quoted, no law can ever be passed 
impairing the obligations of a contract, and no exception is made, consequently the contracts 
of a drainage district stand upon the same footing as those of individuals or any other agency. 
The legislature cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize under the police 
power of the state the creation of a contracting agency and permit the contracting of 
obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and abolish its obligations. To 
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permit the legislature to do so would destroy the very essence of the constitutional 
prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution. Were 
it otherwise no person would ever be safe to enter into a contract with public or quasi-public 
corporations, creatures of the law. 
Straus and Nicholson v. Ketchum, 54 Idaho 56, 83,28 P.2d 824,834 (Idaho, 1933). This reading 
of the Idaho Constitution is completely consistent with the earlier pronouncement that legislative 
actions which impair contracts are "clearly void." Fidelity, supra. 
By 1954, when Penrose was decided, it was apparent to this Court that the federal decisional 
law relative to state action which impaired contracts was evolving in a manner consistent with 
jurisprudence which allows for a police power right of state and federal governments to, in the right 
circumstances, trump federal constitutional protections. The difference between this federal 
approach and Idaho decisions treating Art. I § 16 as an absolute prohibition against the impairment 
of contracts by state action is well demonstrated by the decision in United States for the Benefit of 
Midwest Steel and Iron Works v. Henly, 117 F. Supp. 928 (D.C. Idaho, 1954). In that case, several 
months prior to the decision in Penrose, the U.S. District Court for the District ofIdaho, applying 
federal decisional law, determined that the same attorney fees statute which was found by our Idaho 
Supreme Court, in Penrose, to be a violation ofthe Idaho Constitution, was not a violation of the 
Art. 1 § 10 of the United States Constitution. With full knowledge ofthe decision in United States 
for the Benefit of Midwest Steel and Iron Works v. Henly, this Court nevertheless found in Penrose 
that the statute in question violated the Idaho prohibition against impairment of contracts. Since 
Penrose was decided this Court has never signaled the intention to adopt or to move toward the 
approach adopted by the federal courts relative to the application of Art. 1 § 10 of the United States 
Constitution. 
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The approach taken by this Court in Penrose and subsequent decisions is supported by the 
difference in the language of the two constitutional provisions. With respect to restrictions upon the 
impairment of contracts, the United States Constitution provides: "Art. 1 § 10. No State shall ... 
pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts ... " In Article I of the Idaho Constitution, 
"Declaration of Rights [of citizens ]," the prohibition against legislation impairing contracts provides: 
Art. I § 16 - Bill of attainder, etc., prohibited - No ... law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall ever be passed.7 
While both provisions have facially preclusive language, it is reasonable based upon both language 
and context to read Idaho's language as intended to provide the contracts formed by Idaho citizens 
with absolute protection. 
The drafters of the United States Constitution were balancing federal power (including 
protection of the citizens) against the rights of the states to operate within their own borders. These 
considerations might be seen as a basis for reading into "any law" the conditioning language "not 
based upon a valid exercise of the State's legitimate police power." Certainly, this approach has 
been taken in federal decisions interpreting the breadth of the protections afforded to individual 
citizens by the federal constitution as balanced against the state police power. 
Conversely, the drafters of the Idaho Constitution were themselves citizens seeking to form 
a government that was not unduly powerful. They set about doing this in Article I which established 
the rights reserved to the citizens and thereby limits the power of the State government over Idaho 
7 The word "ever" is in the context used commonly defined as: 
2. a : at any time <more than ever before> 
b : in any way <how can I ever thank you> 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ ever. 
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citizens. Moreover, the drafters of the Idaho Constitution had the benefit of the language of the 
United States Constitution which, in some instances, they freely used verbatim. (e.g. Compare the 
4th Amendment, United States Constitution with Art. I § 17, Idaho Constitution). In drafting the 
prohibition against the legislative impairment of the obligations of contracts, the Idaho drafters 
eschewed relevant language of the United States Constitution and crafted instead a provision which 
prevents the legislature from "ever" passing a statute which impairs contracts. Had the drafters 
considered the federal constitutional protection to be sufficient this change would not have been 
necessary. Under these circumstances it makes perfect sense that the Idaho Appellate Courts have 
long read no exceptions into the word "ever." 
The decisional law relative to the restriction against the impairment of contracts stated in the 
United States Constitution has been interpreted by federal courts to provide conditional protection 
to the contracts of state citizens. Conversely, the decisional law ofIdaho relative to Art. I § 16 of 
the Idaho Constitution has consistently been read as rendering void any state action impairing 
contractual obligations between Idaho citizens and businesses. The wording of the respective 
provisions and the context in which they were adopted support these distinctly different approaches. 
Thus, while the language of the United States Constitution has been interpreted to leave open the 
possibility of exceptions, the language of the Idaho Constitution has been and should be seen as 
providing greater protection to Idaho citizens. "Ever," one must think, means never, not 
"sometimes" or "on occasion" or "when the SIP is out of sorts with a decision of this Court." 
Appellants' Brief Page 22 
2. Where a provision of the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection to 
Idaho citizens than is afforded by a like provision in the Federal 
Constitution, Idaho Courts should not rely upon federal decisional law to 
determine the rights afforded to Idaho citizens by the Idaho Constitution. 
This Court has observed that because: 
... federal and state constitutions derive their power from independent sources ... , state 
courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own constitutions greater protection 
than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court. This is true even when the constitutional provisions implicated contain similar 
phraseology. Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly apply United States 
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the process of interpreting their own 
constitutions. (citations omitted.) 
State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6; 696 P.2d 856, 861 (1985). 
This observation was repeated by this Court in State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 ; 842 P .2d 660 
(1992) in which this Court declined to adopt the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, 
which had been formulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897,104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). This Court perceived thatthe decision in Leon derived 
from the fact that the federal courts had for some time been developing a narrowing view of the 
justifications for and benefits of the exclusionary rule. This Court concluded that the by-product of 
this narrowing process was not consistent with the broader reasons which motivated Idaho to adopt 
the exclusionary rule in the first instance. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 992-993, 842 P.2d at 671-672. 
Because Idaho had adopted an exclusionary rule which caused the Idaho Constitution to afford its 
citizens with more protection than was apparently conferred upon them by the United States 
Constitution, this Court rejected the "good faith exception" which was a by-product of evolving 
federal decisional law. 
There are then, in this case, three primary reasons why it is appropriate to determine that 
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federal decisional law cannot be relied upon for the purpose of determining ifthe state action at issue 
in this case violates the protections afforded by Art. I § 16 of the Idaho Constitution. First, it is clear 
that, on its face, Art. I § 16 is more restrictive than the different language employed in United States 
Constitution's "contracts clause." Second, there is every reason to believe that in the circumstances 
that confronted the drafters of each constitution, the Idaho drafters had greater motivation to limit 
the State's rights and, thus, to impose an absolute prohibition and opposed any lesser barrier which 
could accommodate some state interference with existing contracts. Third, the decisional law of 
Idaho has, in full recognition of the different path being followed by federal courts, consistently 
treated the restriction against contractual impairment as absolute with respect to contracts among 
citizens and between citizens and governmental or quasi-governmental entities. 
These three factors individually and in conjunction with each other compel the conclusion 
that federal decisional law is irrelevant to the resolution ofthe issues presented by this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
F or the forgoing reasons it is respectfully requested that the Court determine that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to the SIF and in denying partial summary judgment to 
CDA Dairy Queen. For these reasons it is submitted that the Court should remand the matter with 
to the District Court for entry of Partial Summary Judgment in favor of CDA Dairy Queen on the 
basis that SB 1166aa is unconstitutional to the extent that it seeks to repeal I.e. § 72-915 
retroactively. 
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252 IDAHO S:E;SSION LAWS 
ited and paid as are other claims against the State of Idaho, 
and when all actual and necessary expenses incurred in con-
nection with any application for such loan, or for an extension, 
renewal or increase of such loans shall have been paid, ,the 
balance, if any, of the dt1Posit made by the applicant over and 
above the sum total of said expenses shall be repaid said 
applicant from the said "Loan Expense Fund" upon a claim 
audited and paid as. are other claims. against the State of 
Idaho, and such repayment shall be made whether the loan, or 
extension, renewal or increase of loan be or be not made. 
, S:E;c. 4. All moneys paid into the said "Loan Expense 
Fund" are hereby appropriated and set aside to be expended 
for the uses and purposes authorized by this Act. 
S:E;c. 5. Any person violating any of the provisions of this 
Act, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding 
one thousand dollars or imprisonmenHn the county jail not 
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonm:ent. 
S:E;c. 6. All acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith are 
hereby repealed. 
. SEC. 7. An emergency existing therefor, this Act shall be 
in· force and effect from and after its passage and approval. 
Appr~ved March 20, 1917. 
OHAP~[,ER 81.. 
(S. B. No: 221.) 
AN ACT 
TO BE CITED AS THE "WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT," 
. PROVIDING FOR COMPENSATION TO EMPLOYEES FOR 
PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF 
· PUBLIC AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT AND TO 
THEIR DEPENDENTS IN CASE OF DEATH FROM SUCH 
INJURIES: PRESCRIBING THE EMPLOYMENTS COVERED 
:,BY THIS ACT: MAKING THE PROVISIONS HEREOF AP-
· PLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE. AND ALL 
COUNTIES, . CITIES, CITIES UNDER SPECIAL CHARTER 
• AND COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT, VILLAGES, 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS, IRRIGATION DISTRICTS, DRAINAGE 
DISTRICTS, HIGHWAY DISTRICTS. ROAD DISTRICTS 
AND OTliER PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 
PROVIDING THE PROCEDURE IN OBTAINING COMPEN-
SATION HEREUNDER: THE AMOUNT OF SUCH COM-
PENSATION; THE MANNER OF COMPUTING THE SAME; 
,. /9/7 
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THE PERSONS TO WHOM PAYABLE; THE TIME AND 
MANNER OF THE PAYMENT THEREOF AND THE MAN-
NER OF SECURING THE PAYMENT THEREOF; PRO-
'. VIDING SPECIFIC ENDEMNITIES FOR CERTAIN INJURIES; 
DECLARING THE POLICE POWER OF,THE STATE IN THE 
PREMISES: MAKING SPECIAL PROVISIONS REGARDING 
MEDICAL ATTENDANCE, HOSPITAL CONTRACTS AND 
SUBSTiTUTED SYSTEMS OF COMPENSATION, . PAYMENTS 
TO ALIENS AND PAYMENTS TO THE STATE IN THE 
EVENT OF THE DEATH OF AN INJURED EMPLOYEE 
LEAVING NO DEPENDENTS; CREATING AN INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT BOARD OF THREE MEMBERS; PROVIDING FOR 
THEIR APPOINTMENT; PRESCRIBING THEIR DUTIES 
AND POWERS; FIXING AND MAKING PROVISION FOR 
THE PAYMENT OF THEIR SALARIES AND EXPENSES: 
PROVIDING THE METHOD OF FIXING COMPENSATION BY 
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AND BY ARBITRATION; 
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE BEFORE ARBITRATORS 
.AND BEFORE THE BOARD IN MATTERS ARISING UNDER 
THIS ACT; PROVIDING FOR THE ENlfORCEMENT OF 
AWARDS AND FOR APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE 
BOARD ON QUESTIONS OF LAW; PRESCRIBING THE 
DUTIES, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF EMPLOYERS, 
EMPLOYEES AND SURETIES HEREUNDER; REGULATING 
THE CONTRACTS SECURING COMPENSATION HERE-
UNDER; CREATING A STATE INSURANCE FUND TO BE 
ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE BUT WITHOUT LIABIL-
ITY ON THE PART OF THE STATE BEYOND THE AMOUNT 
OF SUCH FUND, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INSURING EM-
PLOYERS AGAINST LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION UN-
DER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; PROVIDING 
FOR THE COLLECTION, ADMINISTRATION, DISBURSE-
MENT AND INVESTMENT OF SUCH FUND; PROVIDING 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A STATE INSURANCE MAN-
AGER; PRESCRIBING HIS COMPENSATION, POWERS AND 
DUTIES; PROVIDING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT BY HIM OF 
ASSISTANTS; PRESCRIBING THE DUTIES OF THE STATE 
TREASURER, STATE AUDITOR. AND BOARD OF EXAM-
INERS WITH RESPECT TO SUCH FUND; PROVIDING FOR 
THE ISSUANCE OF INSURANCE POLICIES AND THE COL-
LECTION OF PREMIUMS THEREFOR, AND MAKING GEN-
ERAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION BY THE 
, STATE INSURANCE MANAGER OF A PUBLIC MUTUAL IN-
SURANCECARRIER; PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR EM-
PLOYERS IN DEFAULT FOR THEP A YMENT OF PRE-
MIUMS, FOR FALSIFICATION OF PAY-ROLLS AND WILFUL 
MISREPRESENTATION; ALSO PRESCRIBING A PENALTY 
FOR THE DISCLOSURE BY THE STATE INSURANCE MAN-
AGER AND HIS ASSISTANTS OF INFORMATION NOT 
OPEN TO PUBLIC INSPECTION;· PROVIDING ~OR THE 
2:)-+ IlI:\I}iJ SlZS::;II.),~ }.:\\\'S 
Slate Insurance :rvl~'l1;'g:er, with the consent of the Slate Audi-
tor. may sen any (If sl1ch securities, the prucceds thereof to 
lie paid over to the Slarc Treasurer for said State Illsurance 
F llnd. 
/Jdlllim'slrnliu)! HxpclIses. 
::;>1:''':. 89. The entire expense of administering the State 
1 nSl1r;l.llce Fund shall I;e paid in the first instance by the State, 
mlt of nloneys appn.lpriated therefor. In the month of July, 
NilHeen I-hmdred Eig-hteen, and semi-annually thereafter in 
slIcll month, the State Insurance 11anager shall ascertain the 
just alllount of expel1se incurred uy him during the preceding 
calendar year, in the administration of the State Insurance 
Fund, includlng expense incurred for the examination, deter-
llliJlatiun, and payment of losses and claims, and shall refund 
;nch amount to the Stnle Treasury. 
ClaSSification of Risks and Adjustment of Prc/lI·iums. 
SEC. 90. Employments insured in the State Insurance Fund 
hall be divided by the State Insurance Manager, for the pur-
'ost's of the said fllnd. into classes. Separate accounts shall 
e kC'pt of the amOIlIl\S collected and expended in respect to 
:tcll sJleh class for convenience in determining equitable 
lte:,; but for the jlmpose of paying compensation the State 
lS\lI';}JlCe fund shall be deemed one and indivisible. The State 
ISllr:1J1ce Manager shall have power to rearrange any of the 
asses by withdrawing any employment embraced ·in it and 
ansferring it wholly or in part to any other class, and from 
eh employments to set up new classes in his direction. The 
ate Insurance Manager shall determine the haz:1rcls of the 
fferl?lIt classes and fix the rates of premiums therefor based 
on the total p::tyroll ;"mcl number of employees in each of 
:11 (\:tsses of ell1ployment at the lowest possible rate con~ 
tent with the maintenance of a solvent State Insurance 
nd :lllcl the creation ,A a reasollable surplus amI reserve; 
I for stich purpose may adopt .a system of schedule rating 
such :1 manner as to take account of the peculiar hazard 
each individual risk. 
Accounts. 
;l~C. 91. 'l:he State I nsl1rance Manager shall' keep an 'at-
nt of the money pilid in premiums hy e::tch of the several 
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State in.surance (ulld and the dis\)uJ'sc}Jlcnt$ on ;)C(I)\.llll (If in-
jl1l'ies and deaths of employees ill each of said l'l;.ISSC;;. inclml-
ing the setting lip of rescr\,e,; adequale to l1I.l!ct al1licipated 
and unexpected losses and to carry the claims to manu-ity; and 
also an account of the money recei ved from each i nd i vid ua! 
employer; and of the amount- disbursed from the State Insur-
ance Fund for expenses. and on accOllnt of injuries ;lnd death 
of the employees of such cmployer. including' the reserves so 
set IIp. 
,.....--... Diddcllds. 
SEC. 92. At the end of every year. and at such other times 
as the State Insurance MaJ1:1ger -in I~is discretion lnay deter-
mine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the 
sever;!.1 classes of employments or industries. If at ally time 
there is all aggregate l.laiance relll.aining to the Cl'cdil (If all)' 
c1nss of employment or industry which the State 1nsJ1rapce 
Manager deems may be safely and l)roperly divided. he \llay 
in his tliscretion credit to (';1,h individual member of such class 
who shall ha\'e been ;1 subscriber to the State Insurance Fund 
for a period of six mon\ hs or more, prior to the lime of such 
re.adj ustment. sllch proJ1llrt ion of such balance as he is prop-
erly entitled to, haviJlg: regard to his prior paid premillms 
sillce (he !:1st readjustment of rates. 
A sscsSlI"lclIls. 
SI~C. 93. 1£ the premi\1l115 fixed for all)' class :-tJ1d collected 
fn:lJll its members are subsequently found by the State Insur-
ance r.-lanager to have been too small {or any period, he may 
determine what additional premiums ,Ire required from said 
c\as:; for sait! period, ;1nd may make :lssesSllIents accurdingly, 
and each of the members of slIch c1:lss sh::tll be kl1Jle to the 
said :M nnager to pay such ;lsseSSl11ent su made UpOIl hil1l within 
thirty days after notice thereof. 
Readjustlllt'lIl of [>ayro/ls. 
St.:c. ~)-I. If the amllllllt IIi pr~·t1liul11 t.:OllecteJ (rol11 any 
employer at tile l)eginniJlg \,Ii ally pcrilld i:; ascertained by using 
the estilll;lled expenditllre oi wages f .... r the period of time 
(overed by such preJ\liuJ\l payment ;IS a lJa~i:;. an adjuslll1ent of 
the al\ll'.I\llIl of sllch prcJllillHl shall be lI1;t<le at the end of such 
period awl the aetJla] :11111)UJll of :;\1(11 pn:llIillln'i-i\t;tll Ill:: ddcr-
JIl.-'lliU :S1:~SSlUN L\\\'S C. :2(lO ':19 
. c. SI<.;\:,\L LAMJ'f1, Whenever a motol' \'ehicle i;:; equipped 
with ,I signal hllll!> to cOl11ply with the provisions of Section 
.:J:':-:j17, tl1(O signal lamp shall be so ('ol1structed al1(\ 10c:.atE.'d 
on the \'<.~hi('le as lO give a signal :rellol\' or red in color, which 
shall b(·! plainly visible in normal sunlight, from a distance: 
of l()~ I't'€1. to the, l'e,1I: of the vehicle but shall not project. 
a glaring 01' claz.z.llIlg light and shall lH:~ or a t~rpe approved 
by t.he eOlllmissionel·. 
"d. SPJ';CIAJ.. HE:-iTHWTIONS ON LAMl'~. 1. Any * Zif/lzted' 
lo,/Ilj) o( ill'/l,/IIill(/.1 iU{f del,ice npun C/. 1II11/f1r I'ehir:/.I~ ot.her than. 
heu:'] lamps, spot Ic~mps, or auxiliary driving lumps which: 
pro,}eeLs H beam or light of an intensity greater than * SOU' 
candlepowE'1' shall be so directed that no jjart of the beam wil I . 
st.rike the leveJ of the " roa(].way on which the vehicle stands· 
at a distance of' more than " 75 feet fro111 the vehicle. 
":2. Nt) per,wl/. ,~h((.l/. citil.le ur mOL'e all!l /!ehicle VI' elluip'lnent 
'/I po'/'/. (( 1/ II Ii iuh:wQII u'i{h an'll la,mp vr del'ice thereon (lisplauing 
((. 'red li!/hl /.isa)!.e from directly in frull'! thereof. 1'his section 
slza.ll not ClJlpl'{f 10 a.ulhurized emergency I:ehicles. 
":J. Fla.shing liuhls an~ prvh£bit.ecZ 0 IJ. molor I'eldcles, eJ:cepl. a.s 
a 'means (({ intiicolina h riUhl or left turn. 
"e. Tm.:cl';s TO CARRY li'LARES OR SIMILAR DEVICES. 1. No 
peFSUU I:i/tall opera/i! aliV uwto?" truck '1(1)011 (I, highwa.u (}7(.l!,.id.e uI 
(!. /Jlwi IIc~,,;.) or residc~I/.('(' dislr/c:l at (U( {J I iwe /1'011/. a hall huur 
((If.C!1' :;II./I.~I'/. 10 a '/(If:( Iluwr liefure s'llIIri.w unless thefe shalf. /)e 
cal'l'il,d ill s'/((:h I:ehicll' (( l:m.jficien,1 Illwl.bur of jla.rr:..':i, IIU/. less 
Ihew 1111'1'1', Ut deei'rie tllnl.(!rns or olher 8il/1/.cd8 capal)le of CO1/.-
li'l/.uU'llrt~/!I IJI"(J(Zncinli three warnina ligh.ls ('((,ell. I'isible froll/ n. dis-
lall.(:(' 1(1' Cli [{'((st :;00 fed, jor a period of (//. le(/$l 8 /lUvrs, II.rcep/. 
Iha.t (I, '/i/()Iflr I'ehic/.e Iro.lI';l}Jorting £nJ{a./iI/i/.a.ules mall /'(/.1111 reel 
fejlectols i/l j)lllCI' (d /he ()ther siynals al}(II'I' melli/Oiled, 
II b .. 'I:enl such ./1(l.1'e, l(( IIlau, sional, ur re.l( ee/()}' sha.1l !)(~ ()f ~I t1!1Jt! 
a.P1JT()(:eti "II IIU! C()IIIJlli.'lNioller a.nd he l:ihall pu.blish IlSt8 II.! .lhu~(! 
dcw/c'l':'; 'II'h lelt he hC/.,~ ((.JI jl/'(}11eil as arielj7f.ole for jJnl'1l(});I'S oj IlllS 
Mwlio//. . 
'il, WI/I'III'N!J' Ill/II IIIlIlor Irnck 8"0.11 ii/liP llpUIi (/ hiyhw(7.U 
ilnrin!l till' wriuc/ (lJ till/I' In/11m. t.£uhleil 1.(/ 1/l1)'~ illilsi lie rti"llla.wd 
nn Ilinior /'(.>ltir/.cJ.';, /1'11.1'1'1' SUI'1t I ru.ck iN /iI/I II)' ('(I.II lIul lie sill II lJi'lt 
IIi' 'jJa.rkl'tl 1/./1' I.lie /)(f.I'NI, flilc,r/ ()r lIIoil/ Irc/felied jlorlJulI iiI Il!.e 
hill/urall, f(:lil'lheJ' disaiJled II}' /l.fll, the rlri/'C'/' 01' ullwr !lI'r.'wli I.n 
charl/e oJ XII(," 1'('Mdt' ,~h(J.ll pla.ce or 1.'1I.1I.~c' III II(' pl(l.('erl, .~/(t:h 
.f/u.tC!,'!, 1([//11'(//:; or (I/her li!(li.II't/ 8iY'JI.a.ll:i III Ill' liyhit'd (/1/(1 1J/.(J(,I!tl 
11/IlJ'/l. IIIC' hillll/('(/.!!, I/f/e' 11./ (£ tlis/l/.I/.c:e IIf ,I:j II(/(,("~ Ilf (tPfJfll.l:i/l/lIll'ly 
toO /('('1 iI/ (f,c/rtll/('(' uJ sUI·II 1'1'1i.it:iI', ()II(~ lit II dhllllln' uf :I:j /IIII'{'., 
u}' (l.jlllreJ.!'il//ull,11I 11I1I/c'C'1 {II Ihl' flfor c~l""lIid I:c,hidc', (/ilililic' Ihird 
IIj)(/II. (II(/(II/'II/! :,ie/I' IIf 1"1' I'I''';C-{I', I'.re'('/II IIi((1 1/ IiiI' !'I'Ii;rtl' i,~ 
/939 
C. :! ,:Ji ':\ ~ II lid I !.! SI':SSlU},; LA "'S Ijl: 
1(I(l/8 11111'Iin(./ ill.l!Clillllltllll"$, IIJrl'l! I'c!d r{'/ll'r/or::; /111.1/1 Iii' 811 Ii/urn! 
i/l hl'iI (lJ ::;ucli IIlher ;;i!lllals (11/(/ //0 J.)11c:1I jla.lIIl· III' !lIIl'llillfl JIM, 
,"lilllll",' j.llrrcl'd adj(u·ell.! Iu 1111(1 "'If·1t ler»' 1I1c!IIIJulIl'll l'l'liid.". 
";1. ;\'0 PC'1'80/1 sjntll Cl.l rulll lil/ll~ uperclll! CI 1111111/1' I(/lrk /rOIl8-
pUflill!! I'.fplusires ia; ({ t'l'1I'!!U III' /Jllrt. III (/ I'I'U'IIII 111'11" II hi!lll/I'(I!I 
/(lIlc'88 il carries .flut/,oS or I'll'cll'il' 1({lIlerllti (/.S her"i" rl'cillireci, 1II11 
.'lIl'h .flllrl's III' ('l('elric l;1l1l1p.1'1!.';; I/lusl I)(~ ('(/'i'(//Jlu /lJ j/f'l/(IIII·i".I! (/ rc.,d 
lillM (file! sIll'll/. be c!u;;pl(/!le(/ 1/11U1i IiiI' rocu[zclI{( 1/'1/1'/1 11/111 (Is 
o:I}lIio·d ill this o('l'liU/I." 
Approved Murch II, l!J:3!J, 
CHAPTER 251 
(H. B. Nil. 178) 
AN ACT 
.H1ENDING SECTIONS 4:3-1701. ,n-t70Z, 4:3-170:3 • .J:~-li04, ANn 
.1:)-1705, IDAHO COTH: ANNOTATED: RI'~PE,\LlNG SEC-
TION 43-J70(), lI)AHO CODE ANNOTArrED; AMENDING 
SECTIONS 4:H707, 4:1-1708, .1:)-1709, 4:j·J710, '1:1-lill, 4:1-J71~, 
~:J-l'iJ:l, 4:3-171,1, ~:3-liJ5, 4:l-liI6, -<la-J7l7, '1:1-171~. ~:1-1'i19, 
~:J·1720, 4:)-1721, ~;j-1722, 4::J-17:!:!, 4:3-1725, -1:.J-1721i AND 4:1-li2'i. 
IJ)AHO CODE ANNOTATF~D, HELATING TO THI~ STATE 
INSURANCE FUND; CH8ATING THE COMJ'I';i\SATION IN-
!:lliHANCE CUIVI1VllSSWN, CUNSISTING UP FIVI'; MEI'I'I-
IlEHS, TO ADMINISTER TI11-: STATE INSllIU\NCr~ FUND: 
PIWVIDING FOR THE APPOJNTMENT ANI) URGANIZA-
TlON OF SUCH COMMISSION: FIXING TilE ()UALlFICA-
TTUNS AND CUlVll'ENSATION OF THE MEMBERS THI~HE­
OF AND pi\ESCRrnrNG ITS POWERS AN J) DUTIES; PHO-
VIDING FOn. THE MI!:THOJ) OF MAKING PAYMENTS OF 
WORKMEN'S COMPI;;NSATlON INSURANCE: LOSSES AND 
PHEMIUM IU~Fl.lNI:lS: PIWVIDING FOR INVEST1\1E:Nl' OF 
SUHPLUS 01{ RI~SI::nVF~ OF Tl-m STATE INSI.lHANCE FUND 
TO BE MADF; Ill' 'I'HE IJI~PAIlTMENT ()to' PUBLIC IN. 
n:STME:NTS AT Till;; IlIl{ECTJON OF SUCJI COiVIMISSlON; 
PI{()VIDING FOI{ CANCI~LLA'I'rON OF ANY POLlCY OF 
\\'()I{KM8N'S C01VII'I';NSATlllN INSURANCE liNIH~n CON· 
IJI'I'IUNS WI'I!';IU': TlfIo~ I~MI'LOYEH 'rS IN IJEI~AlJLT. AND 
SU IlSTITUTING 'I'll r; WUlt!):') "COMPENSATj()j\! JNSU H-
ANn: COM M ISSIUN," "COM i\'IISSlON," "STAT I'; I NSUH-
A ~CI'; MAN A (; I'; i{" II N I ) ,. ~1 A N A(;[o;H" WI-I EIU; N ECI';SSA H. Y 
A:--;II PHO!'I';\{. 
81' II /~'Ii(/('Ied 11"lhl' LC'llhi/ulllrc' 0/ lite ..... '1(1/1' of It/oho: 
81';(:'1'1 uN 1. TIl:ll 0ct:l.iOIl 4:l- I iO I, I daho Code A Il11Ut.a ll'd, 
be, :ll1d I.lll' :-;;]111(;' IWI'{'hy i:-;, al1](lllIl<.'d to I'ead a:-; follow::;: 
'\I 
,;:.!~ J IJAIIO SI:::S::5IUN LA \VS C. 251 ':l~ 
~('1l :Jl1Y or such securi Lies, the pJ'oceeds thereQr Lu be paid over 
In tIn' st.ate treasure!' for said insurance fund." 
81':CTIO;-'; 1:3. That. Section 4.;3~171;3, Idaho Code Annotated, 
be, unci the same 'hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
"Section 4:3-171:3. CLASSIFICATlON Of' HJ::.iJ\:) AND AD.J1JST-
Ml:'}:T Ol~ PREMH;MS. Employments insured in the state insU1'-
anee fund shall be divided by the * * * COl}l.lIlistfion for the 
purpose of said fund, into classes. Separate accounts shall 
be l\ept of the amounts collected and expended in respect to 
each such class fol' convenience in determining equitable rates; 
but for the purpose of paying compensation the state insurance 
fund shall be deemed one and indivisible. The * * * CO?n-
'IIIiil~ill'l/ shall have power to rearrange any of the classes by 
withdrawing any employment embraced in it and transferring 
it wholly or in part to any other class, and fro111 such employ-
ments to set up new c1asses in its discretion. The * com-
mission shall determine the hazards of the different classes 
and fix the rates of premiums therefor based upon the total 
pay roll and number of employees in each of such classes of 
employment at the lowest possible rate consistent with the 
mall1tenance of a solvent state insurance fund and the crea-
tion of a reasonable surplus and reserve; but for such purpose 
and in so fixing such rates of premium, such rates shall be 
fixed with due regard to the physical hazards of each industry, 
occupation, or employment, and, within each class, so far as 
practieable, in ace.ordance with the elements of bodily risk 
or safety or other hazard of the plant or premises or wOl'k of 
each insured and the manner in which the same is conducted, 
together.with a reasonable regard for the accident experience 
and histQl"Y of each such insured, and with due r.egard to the 
accessibi1ity of medical and hospital facnities. The maximum 
amount at wages 01' salary paid to an individual employee on 
which premium shall be collected by the state insurance fund 
shall be $2400 per annum." 
SECTION 14. That Section 43-1714, idaho Code Annotated, 
b~, a11d the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
"Section 43-1714. ACCOUNTS. The * * * cO'lrl.'missiOl/, 
shall keep an account of the money l)aid in premiums by each 
of the seveml classes of em,pJoynwnts, and the expense of 
administering the st.ate insurance fund and the disbursements 
on ae(:()unt of injuries and deaths of employees in each of 
said classes, including the setting up of reserves adequate. to 
meet anticipated and unexpected losses und to carl'Y the claims 
to l1wlurity; and also an account of the money received from 
each illdividual employer; and or tl1l' amount disbursed 1'1'0111 
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injuries \lnd deuth or t\w emllloyecs or such L'mployC'r, tl1dud-
ing the \,\;$('I'V(;'8 so set up," . 
.-- Sr~C'\'Iu}.; 15. That Section 4:3~17H), idaho Code Al1n()t~lt.ed, 
be, and the same hereby is, ~llnended to 1'e:.1(\ as follow:): 
"Section 43-1715 .. DIVIDENDS. At the end of \~\'e\'y yt',ll', 
and at s\.1t:h other tlme:;, as the '" *;' CI),II/.'I/Iil{sio,l ill its 
discretion may determine) a read,justment of the rate shall 
be made for each or the several classes of empl()yr)')\:)n\.~ or 
industries. 1f at any time there is an aggregate balance 
remaining to the eredit Ol any c1as.s of employment or industry 
which the "' .. '" ("lJm.Jn1·ssion deems may be ~arely and 
prope.rly divided, it lTlay in its discretion, credit tu 12adl indi-
vidual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber 
to the state insunl11ce fund for a period of six months or 
more, prior to the ti1118 of such readjustment, such provorLion 
of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to 
his prior V
aid premiums since the last readjustment~ of j:ates." 
ECTlON 16. That Section 43-1716, Idaho Code Annotated, 
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
"Section 43-1716. ASSESSMENTS. If the premiums fixed for 
any class and collected fronl. its members are sUf)sequently 
found bv the * * '" commiss'io71- to have been too small 
for any "period, it may determine what additional premiums 
are required from said class 1'01' such period, and moy make 
assessments accordingly, and each of the members clf such 
class shall be liable to the said '" ('u1nm-ission to l)ay such 
assessment so made upon him within :30 days arter notice 
thereof." 
SECTlON 1'7. That Section 43-1717, Idaho Code Annotated, 
be, and the same hereby is, amended to re.ad as follows: 
"Section 43-1717. RBADJUS'l'MENT OP PAYROLLS. If the 
amount of vremium collected from any employer Flt the be-
ginning of any period is ascert~ljned by using the ~e5til11ated 
expenditure of wages I'DI' the veriod of time covered by such 
premium payment as ct basis, an adjustment of the amount 
of such premium shall be made at the end of such period alld 
the actual amount of such premium shall be determined in 
accordan
ee 
with the amount of the actual expenditure of 
wages ror such periQcI; and if such wag:e, expenditure for such 
pel:iod i:'i less than the amount on which such e::,timated pre.J11-
iU111 was collected, such employer shall be entItled to l'ecelVe 
a refund 1'1'0111 the stnte insurance fund of the difTerence be-
tween Lhe ::lll1ount ",0 pHid hy hi111 and the amount so found 
to be ;H:tuully due, or t.o \1ave t.he amount of such dil-ference crediLL~d on succt\edin~ jlnl l11iul11 paYll1E'nl~ at his npl.inn ; :tnd 
if such :t(:\ ual prell1illlll, wl1l'n ~\) a~e(,l'l.ail1l'd, !.>:\I·\:,(!t!i-\ il1 
111.0\ 110 SI~S:-:;IU:\ LA \\"S 
CHAPTEH ID 
(ll. B. NO. 32) 
AN ACT 
C. H) '41 
Ml!~?\UIN\.; SECTIOl'-: (j!,-!!\)oG lUAHO CODE ANNOTATE I I HE-
LATJ:-.iG TO TltAVEL EXPENSE OF STATE OFFICERS 
ANU El\-lPLOYEI~S, PHOVlJlING AMOUNT FOn THAVEL 
8XPENSE, ANII ltEQLiIHING l-'nIOH AUTHOmZATION FOH 
THAVEL OUTSIDE: TBI::: STATE OF' IDAHO, BY PHOVID-
ING THAT ONLY THE JUSTICES OF 'l'HE SUPHEME 
COllnT AND GOVEltNOn SHALL RECEIVE THEW ACT-
UAL ANll NECESSARY TllAVEL EXPENSE \vHE~ TTIAV-
ELll"G OUTSlTlE THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
'e II: J~'n<lctetl /)1/ the Legl:sl<du're o[ the Sta,te of hh.lho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 65-2006 be and the same is 
erehy amended to read as follows: 
65-2006 ..... TRAVEL EXPENSES - LIMITATION ON 
lMOUNT~FRIOJ:1 AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED-EX-
:EPTIONS.-The state board of examiners shall Ilut allow 
ny claim, or appn'IVe any vOl1cher, 1'01' the expenst:'s of any 
mel'.!' OJ' employee of the stat.e, while traveling on the busi· 
.ess of the state, as provided for ill section 65-2005, which 
hall, exc'lusive of l'aill'oad, stage fare, alld supplic::l, be in 
xcess of five dollars pel' day, when travel j~ but\\'ecil two 
loints within the state and five dollal's pel' day when the 
ravel is to and from points outsir1<! the state. 
No claim for such expense shall be allowed 01' poid where 
,nch expense i.s incllrred while tra\'eling outside o~ the State 
If Id"ho, unless prior to the incurring of such eX])CllSe per-
ni::;sion to incur the same has been obtained in writil1g' from 
,he governor uf t.he state and filed with the state :1tlditol', 
:0 be made a maHer oj' record with the state bOHrd of ex-
lmine1's, except \\'hl~J'e the same is necessarily illclIl'l'ed, in 
:he businc::;s of t.lie ::;[nte, in di1'0ct and continuolls travel 
:1'0111 olle point in till' State of Idaho to another ill ::;;!ilt state 
lVe.I· the usually t.nl\·elecl rout.e: pl'ovided, that the actual 
lI1d necessary e.xpl:~lJSe!;; of the j1l8tiees of the SUIJI'eme Court 
wel. t.he governor, '" * * when tl'nv£~ling to Hnd 1'1'0111 points 
)l1b:;ide (if the state, ::;halJ be allo\\'cd find paid. 
AjljlJ'OVCc! Febrll;lJ'.\' rJ. 19t1J. 
C. 211 '~I IllAII\) :-il·:S~I(]~ J.A \\'5 
CHAPTER 20 




AI\'JENllIl\G SECTIONS 4:1-17IH, ,1:·)-17():!. 4::1-1,0:3, ~:1-17n·l. ·13-
170" OF THE: IDAHO CODE }.NNOTA'I'EU; AJ)])INC A 
NI::\\' ~I,:I:TION TO BE KNO\VX .-\8 SECTION 'l::170fi 
OF 'I'll E lUAHO COl! I:: ANNOT.-\TEII; AMENDING ;:;1-:C-
TIONS -]:3-170" 48-170\), 4:)-1,11, .j~j·l'J.2, 4:3-1713, 4:.~·]7l4, 
~:3-171ij, ~:~-l71G, 43·171" -13·1718, 4:5-17J.\), 43-17Z\!, 4:3-1'7::1, 
4:H7:2:;, 4:-1-1728, ~:H,2li, 4:1-1':.!(i AND 43-1S1G OF THE 
lDABO CODE ANN01'ATED, HELATlNG TO THE ST .. WE 
INS1)lTANCE FUNil; ABOLlSHll"G THE COi\1PE:-~SA­
TION lNSUJ1ANCE C0l\1l\l1SS10N AND CllE!ATlNG THE 
OPFleS OF STATE INSUHANCE MANAGE!H. TO AJ)-
lVlIN1STEJ1 THE STATE; INSUHANCE FUND i l'HO\TD-
INC; Fon THE APPOINTi\IENT OF A STATE INSUHM":CE 
MAN .. \GEH AND FIXING HIS S.-'l.LAIlY AND HIS Tim:).! OF 
OFFICI::: AND FOR FIXING THE Al\10UNT 01" HIS BOND, 
ANn PHESCTI.UHNG HlS DUTIES, LIADlLlTIES, AND 
POWEHSj PROV1DING FOR THE l\1ETHOD OF l\1.-\KING 
PAYl\lEN'l'S OF WORKMEN'S CO!'l1PENSATION LOSSES 
AND l'HEMIUM HE1'UHNS; PIWVIDlNG FOn. THE IN-
VESTlI\ENT OF SUTIPLUS on HESEnVE OF THE STATE 
INSUl1ANCE FUND 1'0 BE MAnE BY TH}(; DEPAHT:vlEN'f 
OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT AT TIU; mRECTION OF THE 
STATE INSUTIANCE lVlANAGETI.; 1'1l0VIDlNG FOH TlIE 
CANCELLATION OF ANY POLlCY OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION INSllHANCE UNIIEIl CONDITIONS WIJEIlE 
nm Ei\1PLOYEIl IS IN nEFAULT, AND SUBSTlTUTlNG 
THE wonDS "STATE INSUHANCE! l\1ANAGEH" AND 
"MANAGER" FOil THE WOHns "COMPENSATION lNSUR-
ANCB COMMISSlON" OTI "GOMMISSlON" WHERE NECES-
SAHY AND PTIOPEll, ANn DECLARING AN El\1EHGENCY. 
Be It ["'II,((cte(Z llY the Lc.!risla.tm"e of tho Stc/.te of Idaho: 
SECT)()N 1. Thnt Seeiion 4;1-1701, Idaho COd0 Anno-
tated. as lIlncnc1ed by Chapter 251, SL!ssion Laws of ) \);19, be, 
and the same if> hereby mmmded t.o rend as follows: 
"Section 43-1701. CRE:A,TION OF' STATE INSUHANCE 
F1JNn. There if; he)'(~h.\' ('\'C:'atcd n fund, to be ]\11o\\,n ;1:-\ t.he 
state il1surance fund, foJ' the PlIl'POSl' of illRllring employers 
against liability fo)' C011l11l'l1:';ntion \Imler this wOl'l';Jllen's 
compcnsn1..inn law * * * (/'/11/, i;111l (JI:C"1t'JJ(),I:i(JllaLcli,~('(/,"" eOIll-1'1(:II,~(fti0/1 1((:1/1 and of s('clIj'illJ.( to th(~ persons entitled there-
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011. accolJlli (I~' jJljl1~'jC$ and deaths of employees in eHch of 
sa1l1 classes, JJ1cludlllg the setting llIJ of reserves adeqllate 
to nlt.!d <1ntil.:ipated and 1I11GXpected lossex nlld to carrv the 
dniml> to maiLlJ:iiy; and also 011 Hccoun1, of the mOllev l'e-
c.eivecl from each individual employer; and of the anlollnt 
disbursed from the state insurance fund fol.' expenses, and 
Oil accollllt of injuries and disablement and death of the 
elllplo~'ees of such employel', including the rcserve::; S,) set 
\1 p." 
SEC. 13. That Section 43-1715, Idaho Code Annotated, 
as amended by Chapter 251, Idaho Session Lmvs of 1939, 
be, .and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
"Secti911 43-1715. DIVIDENDS. At the end of every 
yecU', and at such other times as the * * * J1Janayer in hi.s 
discretion m~ly determine, a l'eadjustment of the rate sha!1 
be made for each of the several classes of employments or 
indllstries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance 
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or in~ 
dustry which the'" * * MCLll.Q,ge1" deems ma:)' be safely and 
proljerl~r divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each 
indjvidual member of such class who shall have been a sub~ 
scriber to the state insurance fund for a period of six 
months or more, prior to the time of suell readjustment, 
sl1ch proportion of such balance as he is propcrly entitled 
to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the ];.'1st 
readjustment of rates." . 
---m;c, 14. That Section 43-·1716, Idaho Code Annotated, 
as amended by Chapt.er 251, Idaho Session Laws of 1939, 
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
Hi"Section 4::1-] 7H>' ASSESSMENcrs. If the pl'e1l1iuJlls 
fixed for any cla13s and collected from its members are sub-
sequently found by the * * '" M(~na.ge1· to have been too small 
for any periqd, he may determine what additional premiums 
<11'e required from said clas~; '1'01' stich period, and may lllHI,e 
8sscssments accordingly, and each of the 111embe1'R of Slleh 
el<lss shall be liable to the said * * * 1i1(l.'!1.({,{Jel' to p~ly slleh 
H:-;:;;(!::\SJl1cn t so made lIpon h irn with i n 30 dnys after notice 
thel'·eof." 
SEC, 15. That Section 43··1717, Idaho Cucle Annotated, 
as amended by Chapter 251, Idaho Session Laws of 1!)J9, 
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
"Section 4::1-1717. READJUSTMENT OF PAYROLLS. 
If the amollnt of premium collected from nny employer at 
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I1lntecl expellditlll'e of 'wages fo1' the period of time l:o\·cJ'(.'d 
bv suc.h premium paymcllt H'::> H basis, and ndjLlstll1cnt of 
tile amount of slIc.h pl.'emiul11 shall be l11ade at the elld of 
such period and the actual amount of such Pl't!!)1iU111 shall 
be determined in accordance with the amollnt. of the nctllal 
expenditure of \yages fo], such period; aWl if slIl:h wage 
expenditure for sl1ch period is less than the amount of 
which slIch estimated pl't:!l11iuJll was collectc1rI. ~lIch employer 
sh,)11 be entitled to receive a l'efund from the state insul"-
l1n<:.e fund of the dii-Yel'ence between the amolilit so paid by 
him and the amount so found to be actually ellie, or to have 
the nmount of such difference credited 011 slicceeding pre-
mium payments at his option; and if sueh actual premium, 
when so ascertained .. exceeds ill amollnt a premiu1ll so paid 
by such employer at the beginning; of such ]h)I"iod, stich 
employer shall immediately upon being advised of the true 
amount of such premium cllle forthwith pay to the'" * >I< 
i11an(~ge1· an amount equal to the difference between the 
amount actually found to be clue and the amount paid by 
him at the beginning of such period, for deposit in the state 
insllrance fund.'! 
SEC, 16. That Section 43-1718, Idaho Code Annotated, 
as amended by Chapter 251, Idaho Session Laws of 1939, 
be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows: 
"Section 43'-1718. POLICIES AND PAYMENT OF 
PHEMIUMS. 1. Every employer insuring in the state in-
Sl11'ance fund shall receive fl'om the * * * il!O.il<l.f]t'·I' n COI)-
tract or poliey of insurance. 
"2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapt!?1:'. nil 
pl'emiums shall be paid by evcry employer who elects to 
insllre with the state insl1r~'tllce fund to the * * * lII(('l'I(f.,r;eI' 
::;e11li-annually, 01' at sLich times as may be pl'escribed by 
the * :I< '" lIIcm.(/.qe;/'. Receipts shall be given 1'01' such pay-
ments and the money shall be paid ove1' to the state tl'('[\S-
Ul'er to the credit' of the state insurance fund." 
SEC. 17. That Scdion 4:':-J7]9, Idaho C()!I(~ Allnotn\l.'d, 
[IS am(?nded by ChaptcL' 2Gl, Idaho Session L;1W~; of l!);'l!J, 
be, and the same hereby is, nmended to l'end as follo\\'s: 
"Section 4:1-17] 9. ACTIONS FOR COLLECTION J?\7 
CASE OF DEFA UL1'. PENALTY. CANCELLATJ'ON OF' 
POLICY. If nn employer shall defnult ill anr Il<I,Vlllellt ]'(~­
fjllin~d to be made lJy him to the state illslIJ':ll1ee fllnd, (IF' 
amount due fJ'om him shnll iH! collectec1 by civil ndioll 
ng'ail1st him ill t1H~ namG of till! * * '" M(W(!.{/I'/', alld it sh:1I1 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature First Regular Session - 2009 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1166, As Amended 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT; 
3 REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS; 
4 DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE 
5 DATE. 
6 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
7 SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has 
8 exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual 
9 amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive. 
10 (2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho 
11 State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and 
12 ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of 
13 a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of 
14 dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance 
15 Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's 
16 ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. 
17 (3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the 
18 statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is 
19 the appropriate venue for such change. 
20 (4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of 
21 the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998, 
22 that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to 
23 regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter 
24 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to January 
25 1, 2003, will conform with that intent. Section 73-101, Idaho Code, pennits such retroactive 
26 repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation. 
27 (5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the 
28 existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance 
29 companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. 
30 (6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to 
31 any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December 
32 31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber 
33 v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying 
34 annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
35 SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed. 
36 SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to 
37 exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval, 
38 and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1,2003. 
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